

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)				
Anatoliy Golitsyn's Letter to the Editor, <u>New York Tribune</u>				
FROM:		EXTENSION		NO.
John F. Pereira Chief, IMS				
				DATE
				23 July 1984
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED / FORWARDED		
1.	Chairman, PRB			
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23 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Publications Review Board
Chief, CI Staff

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Information Management Staff

SUBJECT: Review of Anatoliy Golitsyn's Letter
to the Editor, New York Tribune,
dated 15 July 1984

At the request of Anatoliy Golitsyn, forwarded via the CI Staff on 15 July 1984, the DO has reviewed his attached Letter to the Editor (addressed to the Editor) of the New York Tribune. The article does not contain any classified information. No further Agency review is required.



John F. Pereira

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Attachment:
As Stated

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

15 July 1984

EDITOR
New York Tribune
New York, N.Y.

Dear sir;

I would appreciate it if you would publish this Letter to the Editor, which is my reply to the Lev Navrozov article about my book, New Lies for Old, which appeared in the June 18, 1984 edition of the New York Tribune.

Letter to the Editor;

The Navrozov article which you published on 18 June 1984, takes out of context some quotations from my book, New Lies for Old, [Dodd, Mead and Company, Publisher] concerning communist strategic disinformation and summarily uses them in an effort to denigrate me and to downgrade my inside information and a new analysis of major developments in the communist world. Navrozov dismisses the book as "one of the most sinister pieces of disinformation which has appeared in the west in the 20th century". He blandly states that "the book offers not one grain of information on Russia or the KGB which is'nt already known from the general American press". This is the major inaccuracy of this article. It fails to inform the reader about the true essence of the book; that the book actually contains a new, significant piece of information about the role and use of communist intelligence against the west and its security potential. As pointed out in chapters 5, 6, and 7 of the book, the communist strategists since Shelepin's time in 1959 have resorted to the use of strategic disinformation and various intelligence assets such as scientists, writers and priests. Navrozov's article deals very superficially with effects but ignores and fails to address the causes and roots of the problem. Navrozov questions the conclusions of my analysis regarding the Sino-Soviet split, the struggle for power, the dissident movements, the role of Sakharov and also Solidarity but he fails to indicate that my analysis is based on new and solid information about the use of strategic disinformation, intelligence assets and the controlled political opposition in the communist world. Another major inaccuracy of his article is the insinuation that the book can be interpreted as a disservice to the conservative republican cause and as a service to the anti-defense left and to the Soviet regime. This is patently ridiculous. As indicated in the book the failure of the west to take into account the employment of strategic disinformation and of the communist intelligence potential, has created chaos in the western studies of communist policies and a crisis of western foreign policy vis-a-vis the communist world.

- 2 -

Western intelligence analysts view the present situation in Eastern Europe and in the USSR as comparable to the one in 1956. The situation, however, is much different. In 1956 the totalitarian system was in a deep crisis and on the defensive. At the present time, the communist totalitarian regime is actively using controlled political assets in its deceptive strategy against the West. A passive dormant regime has been transformed into a politically active one which is on the offensive. Thus they are much more dangerous to the West. My book is an honest effort to explain these new factors and the dangers they pose for the West and should sway western public opinion, both conservative and liberal, regarding the crisis. Any unbiased reader will conclude that my arguments defending western interests are constructive ones. I regard the NAVROZOV criticism as a feeble attempt to neutralize the potential impact of the book on the conservatives and a ploy to take my arguments out of circulation. In my opinion, this would result in a great disservice to the American public. I am especially surprised at Navrozov's anger at the publication of the book. "New Lies for Old." One would expect that anyone connected with "The Center for the Survival of the Western Democracies," would address his anger against the communist strategists (Shelepin, Andropov, Arbatov and the fast rising GORBACHEV) as the real culprits and not against a former KGB officer, who, at the risk of his own life, exposed the new Soviet activist methods and the dangers that they pose for the West.

Sincerely,

Anatoliy Golitsyn